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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RODNEY L. PHILLIPS,
Plaintiff-R~spondent,

vs.

Case No. 18211.

JCM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a Utah:
corporation; JAMCES C. McGARRY, JR.;
LINDA McGARRY; JAMES R. GLAVAS, dba:
J. G. REALTY; JAMES GLEASON; ROBERT
G. ANDERSON; UNITED FARM AGENCY.,
INC., a Utah corporation; CLAN
STILSON; and DOES I through XV,
Defendants-Appellants.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the plaintiff against the defendant,_
United Farm Agency, Inc., a Utah corporation, for damages arising
out of a real estate transaction.
DISPOSITION IN.THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable Boyd BuJ;l.nell on the
29th and 30th day of July, 1981.

The Court granted judgment·in

favor of the plaintiff on July 30, 1981, against all of the defendants and took under advisement the amount of the damages
suffered by the plaintiff.

On September 4, 1981, the Court f.iled

its Memorandum Decision (R. 213-215), and on October 14, 1981,
the Court signed and filed its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Judgment (R. 232-243).
The defendant, United Farm Agency, filed its Motion for a
new Trial which was denied by the Court by its Order filed DecemSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ber 24, 1981 (R. 285).

The notice of appeal was filed on

·January 8, 1982 (R. 304).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant requests that this Court reverse the lower
court's decision or in the alternative, remand the case for
further hearing.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff Rodney Phillips operated, as a sole proprietorship, a construction company

kno\~1

as Phillips Construction Com-

pany from 1970 to the first part of 1978.

During the first of

1978 and before the transactions that precipitated this action
(Tr. 242-43),

~he

plaintiff formed a corporation known as Phillips

Construction Company (Tr. 131-32).

After the formation of the

corporation, all of the business and business assets were owned by
the corporation, with the exception of the equipment of which Hr.
Phillips retained personal ownership (Tr. 132).
During 1978, the plaintiff went through a divorce (Tr. 135)
and was facing substantial financial difficulty in that his checks
were bouncing (Tr. 287-88).

Accordingly on January 25, 1978, the

plaintiff listed his home and construction business for sale with
the defendant Robert Anderson, a real estate agent (Ex. 6, Tr. 14).
At a later time, . a separate listing was made for the construction
business alone which listed the selling price of $200,000 (Tr.

14-15).

None of the listings were signed by Clan Stilson or a

person in authority for United Farm.

Mr. Phillips corJmunicated

to the real estate agent that the business had grossed over a
million dollars during the last year and that the business had a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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·~. mit.ing

list for ne·w construction (Ex. 8), althouc;h the records

of the business did not reflect any of those representations
(Ex. 43, 44, 45 and 46).

On June 13, 1978, two additional list-

ings were signed by the plaintiff on the shop and business lowering
the price to $185,000 in an attempt to expedite the sale of the
business (Tr. 27-28, Ex. 14, 15).
Mr. Gerald (Bud) Stocks introduced the defendants, James
Gleason and James McGarry to Mr. Anderson as persons who were
interested in buying Phillips Construction Company (Tr.. 37,
343-45).

On July 17, 1978, James G. McGarry, James Gleason, Bud

Stocks arid Robert Anderson met Rodney Phillips on the site of
one of Phillips's jobs to discuss the possible sale of the business (Tr. 38, 136).

At that time, Gerald (Bud) Stocks was intro-

duced as a referring real estate agent from First Realty Group,·
Mr. McGarry as president of JCM Development Company and James
Gleason as an associate of McGarry's and agent of.J. G. Realty
(Tr. 136-37, 341-42, 38-39).

The afternoon of July 17, 1978,

was spent looking at some of the corporation's jobs amd equipment, meeting employees and reviewing some of the documents relating to the business operation of the const_t;uction company (Tr.
40-41, 137-38, 142, 344-45).
On July 18, 1978, the parties met mid-morning and went to

the construction company's office.

The parties reviewed documents,

looked at equipment and engaged in discussion relative to a
possible sale (Tr. 41-43, 143-44).

During the late afternoon or

evening of July 18, 1978, Bob Anderson, James

M~Garry,

James Glea-

son and Rodney Phillips met at Mr. Anderson's <?ffice (Tr. 43, 143).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-~-

There is a dispute in the evidence as to the extent of Larry Anderson's involvement in the meeting, but Rodney Phillips, acting for
the corporation, James McGarry for JCM Development Company and
James Gleason for J. G. Realty came to terms and signed an earnest
money agreement:

A check for $5,000.00 was presented to the plain-

tiff, but no closing date was set

(Ex. 18, Tr. 43, 50-51, 144-45).

After the plaintiff Phillips had met with McGarry and Gleason,
the defendant Robert Anderson, learned that the parties were going
to complete the sale by means of a simple stock transfer and a bill
of sale (Tr. 43).

Mr. Anderson advi.sed the plaintiff that the

transaction should not be handled that way and commented that
the Bulk Sales Act would not be complied with and that other
essential elements of a typical sale were being omitted (Tr. 43-45,
49).

The defendant Anderson testified that after he had protested

the manner in which the transaction was being handled, Mr.
Gleason stated that Mr. Anderson should let Gleason handle the
transaction and accordingly the earnest money was written on Mr.
Gleason's forms (Tr. 45, 47, 48).

Mr. Anderson did not see the

signed earnest money until almost a month later (Tr. 52), and
assumed that the plaintiff knew that he was not representing him
because Phillips signed an agreement against Anderson's advise
on another real estate company's forms (Tr. 53).

The Court found

that Anderson never expressly advised the plaintiff that he was
no longer representing Phillips (R. 234, Findings No. 13).
Contemporaneous to the time of the transaction that he was
negotiating for the plaintiff with McGarry, Gleason and JCM
Development Company, the defendant, Robert Anderson, had been
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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requested to sell 20 acres of his land in Spanish Valley to
McGarry, Gleason and JCM Development Company and to help in
the d.eve lo pm en t o £ other property (Tr. 3 7, 3 8) •

At the time

of the negotiation, Robert Anderson was behind on his
$1,000.00 payments to First Security Bank on the Spanish
Valley.property (Tr. 32-33).

On July 18, 1978, Anderson

signed an earnest money with J. G. Realty and JCM Development
Company for the purchase of his 20 acres (Ex. 19, Tr. 55, 56).
Anderson testified that the plaintiff knew of

th~

transaction

because he told him and because Phillips was asked to do work ·
on the subdivision property by Skipper Resources (R. 59).

In··

fact, the plaintiff admitted at trial that he knew about the
development (Tr. 155, 156).
In addition, Anderson was negotiating to obtain exclusive
listings on the lots that would be developed on the land he had
sold to JCM Development and the surrounding acreage that was to be
developed into a mobile home subdivision (Tr. 60-62), _by JCl 1. Develop11

ment, McGarry and Gleason. McGarry and Gleason intended to use
Phillips Construction Company to construct the development (Tr. 65-66).
The plaintiff contended that the defendant Anderson .represented to him.on several occasions that JGM Development Company
was worth millions of dollars (Tr. 153, 154), but.Anderson testified that he reported only what Gleason and McGarry had told him
(Tr. 67-68).

Obviously Anderson would not have dealt with the other

defendants personally, if he knew of any financial problems or financial risk.
The parties continued their.preparation for closing and on

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Aut;ust 14, 1973, the plaintiff met with James McGarry, James
Gleason and Robert Anderson (Tr. 161).

Calculations and computa-

tions were made by the parties, and adjustments to the inventory
were made.

The accounts receivable and payable were adjusted

by the plaintiff and the defendants McGarry and Gleason (Tr. 16162).

The earnest money had provided for a Forty Thousand Dollar

($40,000.00) down payment which> at the meeting of August 14th,
was converted to a Thirty-five Thousand Dollar ($35,000.00) promissory note, signed by JCM Development Corporation which together with the Five Thousand Dollar ($5,000.00) down payment
totaled Forty Thousand Dollars ($40,000.00) (Tr. 162-63,
Ex. 24).

The remainder of the plaintiff's equity was evidenced

by another promissory note in the amount of Forty-four Thousand
Dollars ($44,000.00), payable over a period of years, signed
again by JCM Development Corporation (Tr. 163, Ex. 25).
In addition to the two promissory notes, the plaintiff, on
behalf of the corporation, signed warranty deeds, stock transfer
papers and other related documents transferring all of his interest in the corporation to the defendant, JCM Development
(Tr. 163-165).

The plaintiff testified that the signing of the

documents took over two hours (Tr. 163).

Robert Anderson testi-

fied that he typed some of the docu.illents and compiled information
as ·requested by the various parties (Tr. 82-83).

Robert Anderson

testified that he didn't think he was conducting a closing in
t~at United Farm's ptilicy required that a closing through their

agertcy be done by the broker or through an attorney, neither
of which occurred in this case (Tr. 29).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The plaintiff testified that he relied on certain representations of the defendant, Anderson, as to the financial solvency of
the defendants in accepting the promissory notes without security
(Tr. 164;...165).

The defendant, Robert Anderson, denied making any

such representations and stated that he had communicated only what
had been communicated to him by McGarry and Gleason

(Tr~

74, 88-89).

After the execution of the documents on.August 14, 1978,
the promissory notes signed by these defendants were not paid.
There was no evidence at trial to directly connect the
defendant, United Farm Agency or the broker Clan Stilson to this
transaction.

The only liability of United Farm Agency and Clan

Stilson is derivative.

No one acting in the furtherance of

United Farm's interest participated in the transaction.

Addi-

tionally United Farm never received any monetary benefit or any
portion of a commission from the sale.
POINT l
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE INTRODUCED
AT TRIAL TO BASE A VERDICT AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT, UNITED FARM AGENCY, INC., A
UTAH CORPORATION.
In the Court's Findings of Fact. and Conclusions of Law, the
Court found that the defendant, Robert Anderson, breached his
fiduciary duty to the plaintiff (1) by by unilaterally deciding
not to further represent the plaintiff in the sale of his property and by not advising the plaintiff of said decision (Findings No. 25, R. 236); (2) by failing to discharge his duty to
verify the solvency of JCM Development and by representing the
worth of JCM to the· plaintiff (Findings No. 26, R. 237); (3) by
failing to discharge his duty, imposed by United Farm Agency
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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policy, to see that an

a~torney

conduct the plaintiff's closing

(Findings No. 27, R. 237); (4) by preparing unsecured notes
and allowing the plaintiff to accept said notes and to part with
his assets (Findings No. 28, R. 237); and, (5) by failing to
investigate J. G. Realty and assuring the plaintiff of J. G. Realty's
legitimacy (Findings No. 29, R. 237).
The evidence in this case, simply does not support the imputation of Robert Anderson's liability to the broker, Clan Stilson,
or to United Farm Agency, a Utah corporation.

The only proof

elicited regarding the issue of agency or employment was done
during the examination of Robert Anderson.

Mr. Anderson

testified that he was a sales representative for United Farm
Agency of Utah and that his duties included responsibilities for
the listing and selling of property (Tr. 4).

Further, Robert

Anderson testified that he was a real estate agent, having been
licensed in the state of Utah since 1975 and that Hr. Clan Stilson
was the broker for United Farm Agency in the State of Utah (Tr.
5-6).

When specifically asked what role Clan Stilson played in
the transaction which precipitated this lawsuit, l•Ir • ...L\nderson testified that Mr. Stilson had no involvement and further testified
that United Farm Agency policy required its salespersons to
obtain approval of the broker for preliminary matters and that
United Farm Agency required the involvement of a broker or
attorney to handle the closing.

He further testified that on

prior occasions, Mr. Snow, the attorney in Hoab, acted as the
person who handled the closing and that particularly, in other
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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I
I

transactions in which Hr. Phi:.llips had been. involved, Hr. Snow
was the person who prepared the documents and supervised the
closing transaction (R. 122-123).
In this case, the listing of the business was evidenced by
Business and Income Exclusive Listing Agreements of United Farm
Agency (Ex. 6, 14, 15).

After the signing of the listing agree-

ments, United Farm Agency, a Utah corporation nor its broker,
Clan Stilson, had any involvement with any of the remainder of the
transaction.

Particularly, the earnest money agre:ement signed

in this action was not a United Farm Agency document (Ex. 18),
and the parties understood that to be the case (Tr. 45, 145-147).
No attorney or broker for United Farm Agency participated in or
became involved in the Phillips-JCM Development transaction or
closing.

There were no sellers' or buyers' statements furnished

by United Farm Agency as required by their policies and procedures.

Simply put, if the Court adopts the entered findings

of the trial court, the transaction and the exchange of documents
that occurred on August 14, 1978, were in complete violation of
the United Farm Agency policies and practices as established by
the plaintiff in his case.
The relationship of broker and real estate salesman is defined
in the State of Utah by legislative enactment.

Utah Code Annotated,

1953 as amended, §61-2-1 et seq., ·sets forth the relationship
of agent and broker as it pertains to the sale of real estate in
the State of Utah.

The term "real estate salesman," is defined

to include:
• . • any person employed or engaged
by or ·on behalf of a licensed real
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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broker to do or to deal in any act or
transaction set out or comprehended
by the definition of a real estate
broker in §61-2-2 for compensation or
otherwise. (Emphasis added.)
Utah Code Annotated §61-2-3, 1953, as amended.
Utah Code Annotated §61-2-20, 1953, as amended, sets forth
the specific rights _and duties of a real estate salesman as
follows:
It is expressly provided that a real
estate salesman shall have the right to
fill out and complete an earnest money
receipt and agreement in form to be ·
approved by the commission and forms
provided by statute and that a real estate
broker shall have the right to fill
out and complete forms of legal documents necessary to any real estate transaction to which the said broker is a
party as principle or agent, and which
forms have been approved by the commission and Attorney General of the State
of Utah. Such forms shall include a
closing real estate contract, a shortform lease, and a bill of sale of personal
property.
In fact, on all of the United Farm Agency earnest ·money agreements and even as indicated on Exhibit 18, introduced at trial,
there is a space provided on Line 44 for the broker of the real
estate company to sign, evidencing his review of the document.
In this case, neither the broker for United Farm Agency, Clan
Stilson, nor any other agent or employee of Unit.ed Farm Agency,
a Utah corporation, endorsed Exhibit 18 or any of the other
documents exchanged between the parties.

The closing was not

supervised by the broker for unit:ed Farm Agency or by an attorney.
The closing documents and the docurnent-s evidencing the transaction ·
in this case do not meet the statutory requirements of Utah Code
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Annot:ated §61-2-20 in that there was not a closing real estate
contract used in conjunction with a bill of sale for personal
property or other closing statements.

Needless to say, no real

estate documents evidencing the sale were executed on United
Farm Agency forms· or signed by the broker in charge.
In essence, the only involvement of United Farm Agency, a
Utah corporation, is that of· the listing agreement.

All of the

transactions after that point in time were handled by Robert
Anderson without complying either with the statutory requirements set out above or with United Farm Agency policy and procedure.
In analyzing the question of when United Farm Agency would
be liable for the acts of Robert Anderson, several Utah Supreme
Court cases are instructive.

The Utah Supreme Court dealt with

a similar matter in Wilkerson.v. Stevens, 16 Utah 2d 424,
403 P.2d 31 (1965).

In that case, the vendor brought an action

against a real estate salesman to recover a sum of money received
by the salesman as an intermediary in connection with the sale of

a house, and against the realty company as an undis.closed principle.

The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the

realty company and the vendor appealed.

In affirming the deci-

sion, the Supreme Court, through Justice Crockett, stated the
criteria to be applied in analyzing the responsibility
realty company.

o~

the

The Court· noted that since the plaintiff had

dealt with the real est.ate agent on a personal basis and sought
to go beyond that agent to hold a third party liable, it was the
plaintiff's burden to prove that such a principal and agency
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

relationship existed.

Wilkerson, supra at 32.

Sec also,

Cote v. A. J. Bayless Markets, Inc., 128 Az. 438, 626 P.2d 602

(1981); B & D Investment Corp. v. Petticord, 48 Or.App. 345,
617 P.2d 276 (1980) (Further, the cases speaking to that issue
have held that there is no presumption of agency and that evidence must be put on by the person who alleges it.

398 P.2d 799 (Okla. 1965);

Seattle~First

Sturm v. Green,

National Bank v. Pacific

Bank of Wa~hington, 22 Wash.App. 46, 587 P.2d 617 (1978)).
Justice Crockett in Wilkerson supra, specifically pointed
to the fact that there had been prior dealings between the plaintiff
and the defendant, Stevens, and that in one such transaction, the
real estate agent had agre-ed to terms other than cash for the
payment of his commission.

Justice Crockett pointed to the fact

that the real estate ,agent -had.acted in his own name and that
there was no listing agreement with the realty company and that
its name did not appear on any document nor was it mentioned in
any way.

Further, the Court concluded that the plaintiff had not

relied upon the agent in connection with the realty company.
Justice Crockett stated that inasmuch as the realty company did
not receive or claim a commission on the transaction and that it
did not participate in any manner or know anything about the
transaction until the lawsuit was filed,

the realty company ought

not to be held responsible for the acts of the agent.

Wilkerson,

supra at 32-33.
The meaningful differences between the facts in Wilkerson,
suera, and the facts of this case are that in this case, there
is a listing agreement on a United Farm Agency form, although
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the broker's signature does not appear thereon and because
there is no undisclosed principle in this case.

As in the

Wilkerson case, Robert Anderson and the plaintiff had extensive prior dealings.

In fact, the plaintiff, in tracing that

history of prior dealings between Phillips and Anderson consumed from page 7 of the transcript through page 30.

Throughout

the transcript, there is reference to prior dealings ·between
Robert Anderson individually with the plaintiff.

In accord

with the Wilkerson case, there had been a prior instance between Anderson and Phillips in which Anderson did not get a
cash commission hut simply received office space in a building
and in addition, was charged no rent for three months (Tr.
7, 132-33).

Further, in accord with the Wilkerson case, the

plaintiff, Phillips, testified that his reliance on Robert
Anderson came because of his prior experience with him.
The plaintiff testified explicitly as follows:
Bob was-had-he handled all my dealings·
and I had complete trust with him. He
had done a fantastic job closing my home
and my motel, and we were doing exactly
the same thing. We were putting together
the closing papers on this transaction
the exact same way we had done with my
motel. We went over all these papers
and filled them all and then we took them
down to Harry Snow, and he finalized it,
and I thought that's what we were going
to do on.this sale and I expected that
the same process to take place.
(Tr. 165).

Despite the fact of the prior dealings, Harry Snow

was never contacted, a closing statement was never made, (Tr.
170), and neither Harry Snow nor the broker for United Farm
Agency was ever contacted rega.rding the case.
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The Utah Supreme Court in Wells v. Walker 3ank

& Trust Co.,

Inc., 590 P.2d 1261 (Utah 1979), stated this rule again in a
case which involved an action by an assignee for the benefit of
the creditors of a trust against banks, alleging that the banks
had negligently honored "altered" checks drawn on the trust
account.

In that case, the Court stated the general principles

relative to this issue:
Walker Bank urges that the doctrine of
respondeat superior is applicable. As
is true in other areas of the law, the
general rule regarding the liability of
a master for such acts of his servant,
is that an alteration of a negotiable
instrument (or other document) by an
agent is, in effect, the act of ·his
principal if such alteration is made
within the scope of the express or implied authority of the agent.
It is of
course to be recognized that if the employee is not so authorized and is. act.ing
for his own interest, and not in furtherance
of the employer's business, the latter
would not be bound by his act.
(Emphasis
added.)
Wells, supra, at 1263-64.

A further statement of this legal

principle is found in 3 Am.Jur.2d, Agency, §267
Fundamentally, and according to both the
restatement and the American Courts, there
is no distinction to be drawn between
the liability of a principal for the
tortious act of his agent and liability
of a master for the tortious act of his
servant.
In both cases, the tort liability is based on the master and servant,
rather than any agency, principle; the
liability for the tortious act of the
employee is grounded upon the maxim of
."respondeat superior" and is to be determined by considering, from a factual standpoint, the question whether the tortious
act was done while the employee, whether
agent or servant, was acting within the
scope of his employment.
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3 A:m.Jur.2d Agency, supra at 632.
Accordingly,
number:

t~e

issues presented in this point are two in

First, whether the relationship of employer-employee

existed between Anderson and United Farm Agency, and second,
whether the actions of Anderson were authorized or whether they
were acts for his own interests and not in furtherance of his
employer's business.
Various courts have looked at a variety of factors to determine whether a person is an employee or.an independent contractor.
A list of some of the factors to be considered are found in
Stewart v. Midani, 525

F~Supp.

823, 849 (N.D.Ga. 1981).

The

Court listed eight factors as being indicative of an employee- ·
employer relationship:

(1) the right of the employer to direct

the work step by step; (2) contracts to perform a service rather
than to accomplish a task; (3) the employer's authority to con_trol the employee's time; (4) the employer's right to inspect the
employee's work; (5) who supplies the equipment; (6) the right
·to

ter~inate

the

~ontract;

(7) the nature or skill 6£ the

employee's wor:k; and, (8) the method of payment.
The Utah Supreme Court, in the context of the statutory
·definition of "independent contractor'' in workman's compensation matters, has stated the following:
Speaking in generality: an employee is
one who is hired and paid a·salary, a
wage, or at a fixed rate, to perform the
employer's work .as directed by the employer .
and who is subject to a comparatively
high degree of control in performing
those duties. In contrast, an independent
contractor is one who is engaged to do
. some particular project or piece of work,
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usually for a set total sum, who may do
the job in his o~m ·way, subject only to
minimal restrictions or controls and is
responsible only for its satisfactory
completion.
The main facts to be considered as bearing on the relationship here are: (1)
whatever covenants or agreements exist
concerning the right of direction and control over the employee, whether express
or implied; (2) the right to hire and
fire; (3) the method of payment, i.e.,
whether in wages or fees, as· compared
to payment for a complete job or project;
and, (4) the furnishing of the equipment.
Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316; 318 (Utah

1975).
It is respectfully submitted that the plaintiff did not put
on sufficient proof to establish the employment relationship and
that the evidence.which was introduced proves that an employer-

employee relationship did not exist and that any acts of Anderson
were for his ovm interests not within the authority given him
by United Farm Agency.
The evidence introduced at trial indicates that Mr. Anderson
was not an employee of United Farm Agency.

There was no showing

that United Farm Agency had the right or ability to control or
direct the work step by step.

In fact, aside from setting out

its .policies and procedures as to how a proper transaction should
be handled for United Farm Agency, there was no supervision at
all of 1'1r. Anderson's activities and conduct.

In fact, the work

that was done, in closing this transaction:,,on August 14th, did
not involve any of United Farm Agency forms nor did it comply
with its established procedures.

In this case, Robert Anderson
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agreed to perform a service for a set fee as opposed to so1ae
hourly compensation.

There was no evidence that withholdin6

taxes were taken from Mr·. Anderson's commission and established
practice indicates that such would not be the case.

There was

no evidence as to any employee health or pension benefits.
Further, there was no evidence at all that United Farro Agency
had furnished Mr. Anderson with any accouterments for his
office or for use in real estate transactions.

In addition, no

monetary benefit was ever received by United Farm for Anderson's
efforts in this transaction.

The evidence is simply insuffi-

cient to establish an employer-employee relationship between
United Farm Agency and Robert Anderson.
Even aside from the employer-employee issue, the way
that the transaction was handled, as found by the Court in the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, clearly established
that the manner in which the transaction went forth was in
direct contravention with the policies and_procedures of United
Farm Agency and in contravention of the requirements of the Utah
State statute.

Accordingly, as noted in the two Supreme Court

cases discussing the issue, the activities of 1-'Ir. Anderson as
found by the trial court were outside of his a_uthority and done
for his ovm interest.

The Court explicitly found .that at the

time that Mr. Anderson was negotiating the real estate transaction
for Mr. Phillips, he himself had dealt with JCM Development Company, Mr. McGarry and Mr. Gleason in selling his 20 acres in
Spanish Valley and further had been working with the development
and sale of other real property in the area. . As found by the
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Court in the Walker Bank case, Hr. Anderson was actin6 for his
own benefit.
Based upon the evidentiary record established at trial, it
is respectfully submitted that the decision imputing the conduct
of Mr. Anderson to Clan Stilson and United Farm Agency, a Utah
corporation, is without support in the record and should be reversed.

In as much as the relationship between real estate

salesman and broker is established by statute, there should be
no vicarious liability based on that relationship alone in
light of the clear violations of policy and statute pertaining
to the real estate salesman's involvement in the transaction.
It would create an impossible burden for a real estate company
to be burdened with liability for a transaction it never reviewed
or

~participated

in.

The statute requires broker approval and

absent that involvement, it is simply unjust to impose liabiliey.
Alternatively, justice requires that at least more evidence be
taken on the issue and the plaintiff be required to establish
facts warranting the imposition of the respondeat-superior doctrine.

POINT II
AN INDIVIDUAL CANNOT :V.tAINTAIN AN ACTION
IN HIS OR HER NAME FOR WRONGS DONE BY
THIRD PARTIES TO A CORPORATION WITH WHICH
THE INDIVIDUAL IS ASSOCIATED ..

In the present case, the plaintiff has sued in his name, as
an individual, for wrongs done to the corporation known as
Phillips Construction Company.
The plaintiff alleged in his complaint two distinct types
of damages.

The first type was money due to him. personally
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for his equity in the corporation.

This obligation was evidenced

by two protnissory notes in the amounts of Thirty-five Thousand

Dollars ($35,000.00) and Forty-four Thousand Dollars ($44,000.00) ·
respectively.

The second type of damage alleged was the failure

of the defendants JCM, McGarry and Gleason to assume corporate
debts of approximately Ninety Thousand Dollars ($90,000.00)
(Tr. 317), for which the plaintiff claimed to be ·ultimately
liable, which was never plead in the complaint and are thereby
waived under Rule 9(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
See Point III of Appellant's brief.
The plaintiff did not claim or submit proof that the assumption of said corporate debts was evidenced by· a writing of any
kind at the time of closi.ng.
Appellant's position is that the plaintiff can only sue
for damages resulting from default in payment of the promissory:
notes.

The corporation is the only party entitled to sue with

regard to the failure of the deEendants to assume its liabilities.
Although the plaintiff may have some ultimate liability on those
corporate debts, he produced no evidence of any kind that he
had been pursued individually for said obligations on the majority
of the debts or that the corporation had insufficient assets to
satisfy said obligations or that he is entitled to pierce the
corporate veil of Phillips Construction to pursue the defendants
individuall.

The evidence was that the corporation had assets of

Sixty-two Thousand Dollars to Sixty-three Thousand Dollars
($62,000.00 to $63,000.00) in accounts receivable (Tr. 306).
The defendant testified that Exhibit 45 was the inventory
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prepared for this. sale which described all of the other
assets of .Phillips Construction Company.
document itself,

~·

As indicated on the

Phillips indicated that the assets of the

business' exclusive of accounts receivable, totaled Ninety-two
Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-seven Dollars

($92~427.00).

Accordingly, the total assets of the business at the time that
it was sold to the defendants McGarry, Gleason and JCM Development Company entailed the Ninety-two Thousand Four Hundred
Twenty-seven Dollars ($92,427.00) in the property and equipment
and Sixty-two to Sixty-three Thousand Dollars ($62,000.00 to

$63,000.00) in accounts receivable for a total of One Hundred
Fifty-two Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-seven Dollars ($152,427.00).
As indicated in the statement of facts, the plaintiff incorporated
his business in the early part of 1978 and testified that all of
the business, was owned by the corporation and belonged to thecorporation with the except.ion of the equipment over which he
would retain personal control (Tr. 132).

Thus the ·accounts

payable as well as the receivables were the property of the corporation.
The plaintiff claims in this action that he is entitled to
judgment on the two promissory notes executed by JCM Development
Company and in addition thereto, the plaintiff contends that he
is entitled to judgment for all of the accounts payable of the
corporation as he understood them to be at the time of trial.
It is the defendant, United Farm's position, that the plaintiff
has no right to recover under the present state of the pleadings.
Plaintiff's·equity was paid to him in the form of two proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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missory notes, as explained above.

Another part of the trans-

action, according to the plaintiff's testimony, was the oral
agreement that the defendants, JCM Development Company, Gleason
and McGarry would assume the debts and obligations of the corporation.

Although Phillips may have some ultimate liability on

those debts, there was no proof as to the bulk of the debts and
obligations that Phillips had been pursued individually and that
the corporation, with all of its assets, was not able to satisfy
the obligations of the creditor.
The case of Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596
P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979) is illustrative of this point.

In Norman,

supra, the defendant moved to dismiss th_e plaintiff corporation
as a party·and substitute the individual who was the owner of
nearly all the stock in the corporation.

The trial court granted

that motion and the plaintiff corporation took an
appeal.

On

interlocutor~

appeal, the triat court's decision was reversed and

the corporation was reinstated as the ·plaintiff.

In its holding,

the Court stated:
The facts of this case should be reiterated. Plaintiff is seeking damages it
allegedly has sustained by reason of the
improper disposition of collateral, the
title to which plaintiff held and which
defendant sold pursuant to an agreement
executed by plaintiff. Under such circumstances, plaintiff is the real party in
interest under Rule 17(a), for even
though a sharehold_er owns ~11, or practically all, of the. stock in a corporation s~ch a fact does not authoriie him
to sue as an individual for a wrong done
II
•
by thir d party to t h e corpora t ion.
(Emphasis added.)
Norman at p. 1031, 1032 citing Erlich v. Glasner, CA 9th, 1969,
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418 F.2d 226; Gentry v. Howard, W.U .. Las., 1973, 365 F.Supp. 567.
See also 13 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, §5927, p. 346.
Plaintiff's lack of authority to bring the case in his own
right is a complete incapacity to sue.

He possessed no cause of

action as an individual and, therefore, failed to state a cause
of action.
In its answer, the defendants plead the.plaintiffs failure
to state a cause of action, however, even a failure to so plead
would not waive this defect in the plaintiff's complaint.

In

61A Arn.Jur. Pleading §390, p. 374, this principle is stated as
follows:
The doctrine of waiver as applied to
pleadings has well established limitations. It cannot be invoked in respect
to all faults in the pleading irrespective
of their gravity, for there are some
defects and omrnissions so vital and
radical that want of objection cannot
cure them, since they" go to the very substance of the matter in litigation. Of
such character is an objection • • • •
that it wholly fails to state a cause of
action which will support a judgment.
Failure to state a cause of action is
never waived unless aided or cured by
the answer or subsequent proceedings.
The subsequent proceeding in this case did not cure the
defect that plaintiff never possessed a cause of action.
The plaintiff attempted.to state that he had personal liability for the debts of the corporation (Tr. 222), however, a
shareholder of a corporation is not responsible for obligations o.£ the corporation regardless of how they were incurred.
Parker v. Telegift International, Inc., 29 Utah 2d 87, 505 P.2d

301 (1973).
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The appellants concede that the plaintiff, as an individual, hypothetically could state a cause of action against the
defendants if there was a valid agreement by them to assume
corporate obligations for which the plaintiff was held responsible.

However, no such agreement exists.

See Point III of this

brief.
In the absence of such agreement, the plaintiff can look
only to the corporation to satisfy its obligations out of its
assets.
In this case, the plaintiff transferred all his stock arid
ownership in the corporation to the defendants.

It is axiomatic

that if the corporation failed to pay and discharge those debts
and obligations, then the plaintiff must file a lawsuit against
the corporation alleging the right to indemnification
corporation.

by the

If the plaintiff wishes to assert any personal

liability against the defendants for those debts and obligations, then he must allege some theory that will allow him to
pierce the corporate veil and attach the_ responsibility to individual officers and shareholders.

In this case, not only

did the plaintiff file the lawsuit in his personal name.for
.debts and obligations that the corporation is responsible for,
he also failed to name the corporation as a defendant or allege
any theory against individuals which would allow the court to
pierce the corporate veil.
It is established law that the plaintiff must do more than
simply state that in his opinion, he is legally liable for the corporate debts and obligations.

Certainly, there must be some evidence
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that as to all of the debts and obli6ations, the creditor has
been unable to satisfy his obligation against the corporation and
is, at the present time, seeking to collect those amounts from the
plaintiff.

The plaintiff put on such evidence with regard to

two of the obligations, but totally failed to meet that task with
regard to the bulk of the over One Hundred Thousand Dollars
($100,000.00) of debts and obligations that ~e testified to at
trial.

A simple analogy might be helpful.

If Phillips had co-

signed with any of the defendants on a loan for the purchase
of an automobile, he could file suit for indemnification from
the defendants only if he could prove that the amount was not
paid, that the creditor had sought relief against him and that
he had either paid or became obligated to pay.

In this case,

there was no evidence that the assets "'of the corporation had been
liquidated, or that the creditors had somehow been unsuccessfui
in applying the corporate assets against the corporate liabilities.
Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that -the failure
to pay the corprate debts and obligations may be a cause of action
of the corporation against its officers and directors but certainly is not a cause of action for Rodney Phillips, individually.
Absent the essential proof that he has become legally liable for
the debts .and obligations he testified to at trial from the
bankruptcy schedule, there is no evidence on that issue to support
the judgment.
Of equal importance in this matter is the bankruptcy issue.
Plaintiff testified at trial that although he was having difficulties in

me~ting

his obligations, he was not forced to file
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bankruptcy until after this transaction occurred.

The plaintiff,

as a bankrupt, in bringing this action has violated two fundamental rules.

First·, he has no right to recover debts that

have been discharged in bankruptcy.

Second, upon the filing

of the petition for bankruptcy, the trustee is the person who
has title to all of the assets, causes of action and property
of the bankrupt.

Section 70 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.

§110 explicitly provides that the tr.ustee upon the filing of
the petition for bankruptcy is vested by operation of law as the
trustee.

Clause.6 of §78 provides that the trustee is vested

with title to all rights of action arising from "the unlawful
taking .or detention of or injury to" the-bankrupt's property.
Under this category, the courts have included actions for con.version, and actions based upon fraudulent misrepresentation and
deceit through which the bankrupt has incurred heavy losses.
1 Collier's Bankruptcy Manual, §70-2[7].

See also In Re Gay,

25 Am.B.R. 111, 182 F. 260 (D.Mass. 1910); Constant v. Kulukundis,

125 F.Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).

Rule 610 of the Rules of Bank-

ruptcy Procedure provides clearly that the trustee. or receiver
is the one who prosecutes or enters his appearance in defense in
the pending action by or against the bankrupt on behalf of the
estate.

Because Mr. Phillips has filed bankruptcy, he is an

improper p.arty plaintiff in this action and again there are independent grounds for the case to be reversed.
Because the plaintiff is an improper party plaintiff, the
Court has ample authority to reverse on the basis that the plaintiff does not state a cause of action.

The plaintiff has not
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extinguished his remedies against the corporation, alleged
grounds to pierce the corporate veil and further has failed to
alle\::e that the individual creditors have been paid by him or
L)

that the creditors have initiated· some sort of action against
him.
POINT III
THAT PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT WHICH REFERS
TO THE DEFENDANTS OBLIGATION TO ASSUME
CORPORATE LIABILITIES OF PHILLIPS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY IS VOID AS A MATTER OF

LAW IN VIOLATION OF. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS

In the Court's Findings of Fact, the Court concluded
that the plaintiff had $99,270.21 in obligations which were
not paid in addition to the additional interest on the First
Security and Northwest Carriers obligations in the amount
of $2,624.69 and $4,283.40 respectively. (R. 236, Finding
1123.)

It is respectfully submitted that before the Court can find
· the amount of the obligations as an item of damage for the plaintiff, there must be a showing that the assumption of those obligations was one of the matters negotiated and arrived at between
the plaintiff and the defendant JCM Development Company, James
McGarry and James Gleason and memorialized in writing.

Plaintiff

at the time of trial introduced several warranty deeds but failed
to introduce any of the documents evidencing the transfer of the
stock in the corporation and failed to show any instrument which
perpetuated the agreement in the earnest money to assume any
obligations of the corporation.
The necessary corollary of the failure to have an agreement
signed by the party to be charged agreeing to pay the debts and
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obligations of the corporation, is a finding that the obligation is void.

If the original agreement is void, the Court

cannot impose the void obligation upon the defendants.
Utah Code Annotated §25-5-4 states in pertinent part as
follows:
In the following cases, every agreement
shall be void unless such agreement or
some note or memorandum thereof, is in
writing subscribed by the party to be
charged therewith: .
(2) every promise to answer for the debt
default, or miscarriage of another • . • •
(£mphasis .added}.
The import of the statute is that any agreement to assume the
debts and obligations of another that is not in writing, signed
by the person to be charged is void.

The Utah Supreme Court

has referred to that statute on three different occasions and
has held that where the agreement to pay the obligation is not
an original promise, (a

p~omise

made at the time the debt is in-

curred,), but is a collateral promise (a promise made after the
debt is incurred),

the failure to have a writing evidencing that

fact, signed ·by the person to be charged, is fatal.

O'Hair v. Kounal,

23 Utah 2d 355, 463 P.2d 799 (1970); Sugar v. Miller, 6 Utah 2d 433,
315 P.2d 862. (1957); Brasher Motor and Finance Co.v. Anderson,
20 Utah 2d 104, 433 P.2d 608.
The earnest money receipt and offer to purchase, plaintiff's
Exhibit 18, contains the following language on Line 21,
$40;000.-Total down payment and assume
existing loans on company-building-equipment leaving a .balance df $38,950.00.
The phrase in the earnest money agreement that the buyer was to
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assume the existing loans on the company, building and equipment, is certainly vague and ambiguous and the agreement itself
contemplates a final contract of sale as .shown on Lines 35, 36
and Lines 41 through 43 (Pl. Ex. 18).
offered proof at trial

tha~

In any. event, plaintiff

went way beyond the loans on the

company, building and equipment and introduced evidence of
building supplies, petroleum bills for the business and many
other miscellaneous expenses (Tr. 198-233).
Particularly, the plaintiff testified to a (a) tax lien
in the amount of $11,000.00 (Tr. 198); (b) two obligations
owing to the State Tax Commission in the amounts of $761.17,
$98.72 and $104.86 (Tr. 212); (c) the Division of Employment
Security in the amount of $739.47 (Tr. 214); (d) the State Tax
Commission in the amount of $1,106.93 (Tr. 215); (e) Riverside
Accoustics in the amount of $695.07 (Tr. 216); (f) Kelly Insur.::
ance Company for medical insurance for his employees in the
amount of $1,562.00 (Tr. 222-23); (g) Lou Schwabb ·for gas for
.the company's equipment in the amounts of $674.43 and $243.79
(Tr. 223); (h) Skipper Resources in the amount of $275.00 for
surveying offices (Tr. 223); (i) Strong Construction Company
in the amount of $1,754.00 for gravel (Tr. 224); (j) Motor Parts
Company in the

am~:mnt

of

$L~OO.

00 (Tr. 225); (k) R & R Radio

for advertising expenses in the amount of $900.00 (Tr. 226);
(1) M & J Sheet Metal in the amount of $500.00 (Tr. 226);
(m) Associated Capital in the amount of $2,298.06 for radios
(Tr. 228); (m) Jerry Pruett in the amount of $5,000.00 for a
deposit on a proposal on a building (Tr. 228); (o) Plateau
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Supply in the amount of $54.82 (Tr. 228); (p) Cont:inental Phone
in the amount of $109.64 (Tr. 228-29); (q) Utah Power & Light
in the amount of $548.00 (Tr. 230); (r) Mahoney Chevrolet in the
amount of $439.62 (Tr. 230); (s) New World Life Insurance in
the amount of $1,617.43 for employee insurance (Tr. 231); (t)
Plat:eau Supply Company in the amount of $8,000.00 for materials
including insulation and doors (Tr. 231); (u) Western. Construction
Specialties in the amount of $269.00 (Tr. 231-232); (v) K. U.
McDonald in the amount of $3,700.00 (Tr. 232); (w) Thompson
Body and Glass in the amount of $400.00 (Tr. 232); (x) Spencers
in the amount of $500.00 for office desks and chairs (Tr. 232);
(y) Lewis Hardware in.the amount of $780.13 (Tr. 232);

(z) New

England Life Insurance for $3, 111. 36 for employee insurance
(Tr. 232-233); (aa) the Employment Security Office of Utah State
in the amounts of $938.80 and $6.11 (Tr. 233); (bb) the Unemployment Office in the amount of $731.74 (Tr. 234); and, (cc) the
Internal Revenue Service in the amount of $826.46 (Ex. 39, Tr. 234).
The debts and obligations set out above are simply that
portion of the proof which has no bearing or connection with
the terms written on the earnest moi1ey and offer to purchase
relating to debts on loans on the company, buildings and e4uipment.

It is respectfully submitted that th.ere was no

'\~riting

between the parties evidencing an agreement to pay for the debts
and obligations set out above and that any judgment which entails
those items is void on its face.
The other issue relating to the statute of frauds is whether
or not the debts and obligations on the building and equipment
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are enforceable in liPht of the fact that the parties exchanged
0

warranty deeds and the plaintiff conveyed all of his right, title
and interest in the corporation to the defendant JCM Development.
The Utah Supreme Court has been active on the doctrine of merger
and has stated unequivocably that the execution of a warranty deed
extinguishes the obligations under the earnest money agreement.
In Kelsey v. Hansen, 18 Utah 2d 226, 419 P.2d 198 (1966), the
Supreme Court held that where the real estate broker and his
agent agreed to pay for draperies and other ext:ras involved
in the transfer of property under the terms of the earnest
money with the words "to be arranged", and also provided that
the earnest money would be abrogated by execution of the final
deed, that the subsequent conveyance by deed merged the prior
agreement and the. agent was not: liable on the promise to pay
for the draperies.
In Bowen v. Olsen, 576 P.2d 862 (Utah-1978), the Court held
that the delivery and acceptance· of a deed, executed pursuant
to the provisions of a precedent contract for the sale of real
property merges the rights conferred by the contract into the
deed.

The Court explicitly noted. that unless there is new con-

sideration for the additional promise, the clause would be
termed inseverable.
In Rasmussen v. Olsen, 583 P.2d 50 (Utah 1978), the Court
restated again that: where the deed is given in full execution
of the contract of the sale -0f the land, all provisions of the
prior contract are merged therein, and when mer6er is contested by
a party, the burden is upon him to show the contrary by clear
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and convincing evidence.

See also, Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d

979 (Utah 1979); Baxter v. Stubbs, 620 P.2d 68 (Utah 1980).
In this case, the evidence is undisputed that there was no
additional consideration for the promise of the defendants to
assume the debts and. obligations of the corporation.

Since

the plaintiff could not enforce that agreement against the
defendants, in that it violates the statute of frauds, it is
an improper item of damage to be assessed against the defendants in this action.

Accordingly, since there was no agree-

ment between the plaintiff and the defendant JCN Development
Company to assume the obligations, there is no evidence before
the Court to establish that Phillips would not have been forced
to pay those obligations regardless of who purchased the business.

If there was no contract: to assume debts, a solvent buyer

would have refused to discharge them.
One final matter should be mentioned.

The statute of frauds

has been held by the Supreme Court to be an affirmative defense,
which, must be plead.

There is.no question in this case that

the answers filed by the defendants do not raise the· affirmative defense of the statute of frauds.

It is the defendants'

position that there was no obligation on the part of the defendants to raise the statute of frauds in that the plaintiff in
his fourteen page complaint alleges the right to recover on the
$35,000.00 ~nd $45,000.00 promissory notes and specifically
alleges in paragraph 18 of the Fifth Cause of Action that he
has not been paid for his assets and stock but alleges nothing
about the debts and obligations (R. 1-14).

Plaintiff alleges

injury and damage in the amount of $200,000.00 which is not
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specifically delineated.

The plaintiff, under Rule 9(g) of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure has an affirmative duty to
specifically plead special damages.

The Rule states:

when items of special damage are claimed,
they shall be specifically stated.
There was no indication in the pleadings throughout the course
of the trial that would inform and apprise the defendants of
the special damages claimed by the plaintiff and accordingly,
the plaintiff has waived, as a matter of law, his right to
See Cohn v. J.C. Penney Co.

recover for the debts and obligations.

537 P.2d 306 (Utah 1963).
It is respectfully submitted that the plaintiff has waived
his right to claim the debts as damages or, in the alternative,
any duty the defendants had to make an

affirmat~ve

defense is

obviated by the plaintiff's failure to specify the items of
special damage which he contended he was entitled to recover.
POINT IV .

THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE
RECORD TO SUSTAIN A JUDGMENT AGAINST
ROBERT Al~DERSON FOR BREACH OF DUTIES OWED
TO THE PLAINTIFF.
In the case of Hutcheson v. Gleave, 632 P.2d 815 (Utah

1981), the Utah Supreme Court stated the rule to be followed in
reviewing the findings and judgment of the trial court.

The

Court's statement in that regard is a quotation from the Utah
case of Charleton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P.2d 176

(1961), which quotation is as follows:
In considering the attack on the findings
and judgment of trial court it is our
duty to follow these cardinal rules of
review:
to indulge them a presumption
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of validity and correctness; to require
the appellant to sustain the burden of
showing error; to review the record in
the light most favorable to them; and
not to disturb them if they find sustaintial support in the evidence.
Hutchison, supra, at 816, 817.

See also, Hove v. McMaster,

621 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980); Hopkins v. Wardley Corp., 611 P.2d
1204 (Utah 1980).
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Ranch Homes, Inc. v.
Greater

Pa~k

City Corp., 592 P.2d 620, (1978), it is the prerogative

of the trial court to determine the facts and the Supreme Court
will generally affirm when its determination thereof is supported
by substantial evidence.

However, when the findings is so

plainly unreasonable that no trier of fact could fair.ly make
such finding, it cannot be said to be supported by

substan~

tial evidence and the finding will be rejected as a matter of
law.
In this case, the defendant, United Farm Agency, has a.rgued
for reversal of the trial court's decision assuming that the
court's findings as to the defendant, Anderson's conduct were
warranted.

It goes without saying that if Robert Anderson is

·not liable for breach of fiduciary duty, as found by the Court,
there is no liability for Clan Stilson or United Farm Agency.
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence is insufficient to support a verdict against Robert Anderson as to a
breach of fiduciary duty.

The Court, in finding No. 25 of the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 236), stated that
the defendant Anderson breached his fiduciary duty by unilaterally
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det::.ermining not to represent the plaintiff and by not advising
the plaintiff that he was not representing him in the sale of
his business.

It is respectuflly submitted tha there was in-

sufficient evidence to justify such a finding.

The defendant,

Anderson, testified that he never explicitly advised the plaintiff that he was no longer representing the plaintiff but testified that he told the plaintiff, Hr. Phillips, that he would
not negotiate and complete the sale using a simple stock transfer and a bill of sale (Tr. 52).

As indicated in the state-

ment of facts, under the listing agreement signed by

Mr.

he retained the right to sell the property himself.

Accordingly,

Phillips,

it was not unusual or unexpected for Mr. Phillips to meet privately with Mr. Gleason and Mr. HcGarry in a back office for an
hour to negotiate the deal.

At that:. point, the plaintiff .had taken

upon himself to negotiate the _terms of the sale (Tr. 43).
It is respectfully submitted that even under the test as
set out in Duggan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah T980), the real
estate agent does not have a duty to force himself upon a client.
After being advised that he was using an improper means to
finance the transaction, he is certainly liable for all of the
consequences of that decision.
In finding No. 26, the Court conclud.ed that the de£endant Anderson had breached his fiduciary duty in that he did
not check into the solvency of JCH Development Company (R. 237,
Finding No. 26).

The defendant, Anderson testified that any

amounts or figures relative to the worth of JCM Development
Company or the individual defendants was simply a parading of
the figures provided him by the defendant (Tr. 74, 88-89).
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As indicated in the statement of facts, the defendant, Anderson,
would not have dealt personally with JCM Development Company
had he thought that the defendants were not solvent.

It is

respectfully submitted that there is no duty on the part of a
real estate agent, to investigate the financial solvency of a
person buying property.

That is especially true in light of the

fact that when the defendant was offered the $35,000.00 promissory
note on August 14, 1978, in lieu of the cash which he was
expecting, he stated that_ fact alerted him to the problem
(Tr •. 283).

As stated in counsel's question at trial, it would

seem strange for a company which had substantial assets to have
trouble coming up with $40,000.00 for the down_ payment.

In

light of the fact that the plaintiff, Phillips, knew of those
problems, he went ahead and signed the notes.

The defendant

respectfully urges that the plaintiff's conduct was unreasonable
and that his concerted effort to sell the business because of
his financial troubles warrants the imposition of liability on
him.

The Court in finding no. 27 · (R. 237)_, states t:hat the defendant Anderson breached his fiduciary duty by failing to have an
attorney conduct the plaintiff's closing.

As testified·to by

the· defendant Anderson, he simply typed information that was
requested by the parties.

The defendant, Mr. Anderson, testi-

fied that he did not see the earnest money until almost a
month later and was not aware that the August 14, 1978 meeting
was a closing.

Further, since James Gleason on behalf of the

realty company in Salt Lake City was the person who conducted
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~he closing,

there is absolutely no authority tu impose the

burden. upon the defendant Anderson to obtain an attorney.
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to impose liability upon Anderson and
that the legal test used by the Court in defining the standard
of care to be imposed upon the agent is improper.
CONCLUSION
The appellant is not responsible for the conduct of Robert
Anderson because Robert Anderson was not acting on their
behalf or in furtherance of their interest.

Robert Anderson

was, in fact, an indep.endent contractor with whom the appellant
had no employer-employee or master-servant relation with regard
to the transactions in question.

While it cannot be said that

the plaintiff was ·unaware of Robert And.erson' s nominal affiliation with appellant, it likewise cannot be said that the plaintiff had any dealings with anyone other than Robert Anderson
nor can it be said that the broker or any other person in
authority for appellant signed any of the required documentation pertaining to the transaction in question.
If the appellant is vicariously liable for any wrong done
to the corporation, Phillips Construction Company, the corporation possess the exclusive rights to any causes of action
arising therefrom.

The only theory upon which the plaintiff

can sue individually is that the corporation, or its alter ego,
if any, failed to satisfy its own obligations, causing the
plaintiff to be liable therefor.

The plaintiff never intro-

duced any evidence that the corporation was unable to satisfy
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i~s

obligation or that he had been pursued individually there-

for.

The plaintiff committed further procedural error as to

the form of causes of action alle~ed by failing to comply with
the requireraents of the bankruptcy code.
The plaintiff failed to specifically plead it:s special·
dan1ages against appellant.

This failure was. fatal to the plain-

tiff's ability to recover said damages and obviated any need
for the appellant.to state affirmative defenses against such
-special damages, which, in fact, are barred by the statute of
frauds.
Finally, an examination of the record in this case shows
that there is such a complete absence of evidence in support
of the plaintiff's position that Robert Anderson violated any
duty owed to plaintiff that as a matter of law the decision
'i

~I

must be reversed.

l.1

~IIf
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